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Abstract 
This paper provides a quantitative assessment of the 2007-08 corporate and personal income tax reforms 
in Bulgaria. The simple investment model, based on Tobin’s q-theory is calibrated to Bulgarian data 
before and after the reform. Based on numerical simulations, capital stock is predicted to double over the 
long run.   
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1. Introduction 
This paper provides a quantitative assessment of the 2007-08 corporate and personal income tax reforms 
in Bulgaria. Starting from a rate of 32.5% in 2000, the corporate tax rate was decreased in several steps 
down to 10% in 2007. Similarly, the progressive income tax schedule was flattened until a uniform rate 
of 10% was introduced in 2008. In addition, a dividend tax of 5% was introduced. Those policies aimed 
to promote investment and economic growth through capital accumulation and increase in labor 
productivity. This paper will provide a quantitative assessment of the effect of the tax changes on the 
aggregate economy. The aim of the paper is thus twofold: first, the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia) adopted similar tax reforms in the early 2000s and realized significant welfare gains from 
adopting such pro-market fiscal policies, as demonstrated in Funke and Strulik (2006) and Azacis and 
Gillman (2010). Therefore, those three countries could then provide a useful benchmark when analyzing 
Bulgaria’s 2008 income tax reform as well. In addition, all four countries listed are European Union (EU) 
members and also share a similar history of transition from central planning to market economies.  
Second, the very question of the nature of the taxation system is a controversial one and an issue that 
lies at the very heart of fiscal policy. Furthermore, direct income taxation is an important part of 
government revenue and is thus central for public finance management all over the world. When it comes 
to tax reforms in transition countries, the World Bank (2000) has advised them to redesign and reform 
their tax system design by grounding them in both theory and specific historical evidence, where both of 
those recommendations naturally pointed in the direction of simplifying tax systems by introducing a 
single bracket and a low statutory rate.  
 
We aim to fill both those niches in the literature, in both its theoretical and practical aspects. In particular, 
the novelty relative to Vasilev (2015a,b, 2016b, 2017b) is that here we focus exactly on corporate profit 
and dividend taxation. Additionally, the Bulgarian tax reform in 2008 may be relevant for other transition 
and developing countries. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discussed the investment model 
used, Section 3 outlines the calibration procedure, and provides some simulation results, and Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. The investment function 
For the most part, we closely follow  the setup in Funke (2002), who utilizes a simple Tobin’s q-model of 
investment. In particular, we begin by considering a representative Bulgarian firm. For simplicity, we will 
assume that the firm finances all its investment expenditures from retained earnings, and thus abstract 
away from loan and debt finance aspects. This is not a bad assumption as these markets were not well-
developed during the period.  
The before-tax dividends at time t are then expressed as follows: 
𝜋𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝐹(𝐾𝑡) + 𝜏𝑡𝐷𝑡 − 𝑓(𝐼𝑡, 𝐾𝑡)𝐼𝑡  ,       (1) 
where π are the gross dividends, τ is the corporate tax rate, 𝐹(𝐾) = 𝑎𝐾1−𝛽 is the aggregate production 
function, K is the capital stock, D are the depreciation allowances, I is the gross investment, and the 
investment adjustment function 𝑓(. ) takes the quadratic form 






, 𝛼 > 0 ,        (2) 
The investment adjustment cost function satisfies the standard assumptions imposed in the literature, 
e.g: 𝑓(0) = 0, 𝑓𝐼 > 0, 𝑓𝐼𝐼 > 0, 𝑓𝐾 < 0. These assumptions imply that the marginal cost of adjustment 
is monotone increasing in the size of the adjustment and monotone decreasing in the size of the current 
capital stock. In addition, for simplicity we have normalized the price of capital, investment and output all 
to be equal to unity. 
Next, we define the tax system in order to study the firm’s behaviour. In addition to the corporate tax rate 
defined above, we introduce a measure for the degree of discrimination between the treatment of retained 
earnings and dividend payouts. As in Funke (2002), this variable will be denoted by ϴ and will be defined 




 ,           (3) 
where m is the personal tax rate on dividend income. Next, we express the asset market no-arbitrage 
condition for the firm value, which is 
𝑟𝑉𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡𝜋𝑡 + ?̇?𝑡,          (4) 
where r is the constant after-tax discount rate. The representative firm maximizes the discounted after-
tax dividends over time, hence 




−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡         (5) 
or 




,    (6) 
where d measures the depreciation allowance, and 






𝑑𝑡      (7) 
is the expression denoting the tax bill savings due to depreciation allowances on capital installed before 
the optimization horizon, while 




−𝑟𝑠𝑑𝑠         (8) 
is the present discounted value of all depreciation allowances. Next, the law of motion for capital 
accumulation is 
?̇? = 𝐼 − 𝛿𝐾.           (9) 
The present-value Hamiltonian is 
𝐻 = 𝑒−𝑟𝑡[𝜃𝑡(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝐹. ) − (𝜃𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡)𝑓(. )𝐼] + 𝜆[𝐼 − 𝛿𝐾],     (10) 
where λ is the co-state variable. We define 𝑞 = 𝜆𝑒𝑟𝑡 to denote the present value of after-tax marginal 
product accruing to one Bulgarian lev (BGN) of capital installed in the same period. The optimality 
conditions are 
𝑞 = (𝜃 − 𝑧)[𝑓(. ) +
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝐼
𝐼]          (11) 
?̇? = (𝜃 − 𝑧)
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝐾
𝐼 − 𝜃(1 − 𝜏)
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐾
+ (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑞        (12) 
Lastly, the transversality (boundary) condition lim
𝑡→∞
𝑞𝐾𝑒−𝑟𝑡 = 0  iis imposed to prevent explosive 
solutions.  
Next, for tax purposes, the firm can deduct d=0.2 of the accounting value of its assets, which 
corresponds to a 5-year straight-depreciation scheme used in Bulgaria. Hence, in steady-state, 𝑧∗ =
𝑑𝜃∗𝑟∗.  
Next, to solve the model, we linearize the two first-order non-linear differential equations around the 
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Since the system features a saddle-path stability, 𝜇1 > 0, 𝜇2 < 0. Given that the negative root is the 
table one, it follows that 
𝐾 − 𝐾∗ = [𝐾(0) − 𝐾∗]𝑒𝜇2𝑡         (16) 




) (𝐾 − 𝐾∗)          (17) 
 
3. Calibration results 
In order to provide a quantitative assessment of the fiscal reforms in Bulgaria POST-2008, we will 
calibrate the theoretical model, i.e. we will assign values (based on data) for model parameters so that 
the economy approximates Bulgarian data along the relevant dimensions. As in Vasilev (2017a), capital 
share in the production function is set to 𝛽 = 0.571. As in Funke (2002), the scale parameter a in the 
production function was chosen so that the initial level of capital stock equals 100. The depreciation rate 
of physical capital is 𝛿 = 0.047 as in Vasilev (2016). The tax discrimination variable is 𝜃 = 1 before 
the reform, and 𝜃 = 0.944 after Jan.1, 2008. The discount rate equals 𝑟∗ = 0.05 as in Vasilev (2016a). 
As in Vasilev (2019), we set the parameter for the investment adjustment cost 𝛼 = 6.In turn, these values 
produce 𝜇 = −0.1484 for the stable eigenvalue, which we use to produce the path of physical capital 
after the reform. The simulation results for the capital stock are presented in Fig. 1 on the next page. The 
results support our claim that firms will change their behaviour and invest more after the reform. In 
particular, in the long run capital stock is predicted to double (from 100 to 200). Thus, the corporate tax 
reform stimulates growth by capital accumulation domestically, and/or by inflow of foreign capital from 
abroad. Furthermore, this numerical simulation is consistent with evidence in the Baltics, who introduced 
similar reforms in 2000s, e.g Funke (2002). 




We use a simple model to study the effects of recent fiscal reforms in Bulgaria. To provide a quantitative 
assessment, we calibrated the setup to Bulgarian data – before and after the reforms in personal and 
corporate tax rates, as well as dividend taxation. The numerical results based on simulations suggest 
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